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ABSTRACT
In this paper coherence-based models are proposed as an
alternative to logic-based BDI and argumentation models
for the reasoning of normative agents. A model is provided
for how two coherence-based agents can deliberate on how
to regulate a domain of interest. First a deductive coher-
ence model presented, in which the coherence values are de-
rived from the deduction relation of an underlying logic; this
makes it possible to identify the reasons for why a proposi-
tion is accepted or rejected. Then it is shown how coherence-
driven agents can generate candidate norms for deliberation,
after which a dialogue protocol for such deliberations is pro-
posed. The resulting model is compared to current logic-
based argumentation systems for deliberation over action.
Keywords
Deductive coherence, norm deliberation, normative agents,
argumentation
1. INTRODUCTION
The research reported in this paper is in the context of a
coherence-based approach to the modelling of autonomous
artificial agents. One of the fundamental properties that a
human mind tries to preserve is its coherence. Any new in-
formation is tended to be evaluated for its coherence with
the whole before accepting or rejecting. Taking this intuition
to artificial systems, a coherence-based agent theory [16, 21]
provides the agent with a mechanism to preserve the coher-
ence of its cognitions. With this approach, beliefs, desires
or intentions are only accepted if they belong to a coherent
whole. That is, a coherence-based agent not only selects the
set of actions to be performed, but also looks for the best set
of goals to be pursued and beliefs to be accepted, making it
a more dynamic model of cognitions.
In contrast, traditional BDI theories [20] do not have such
a measure of coherence built into the theory. This means
that agents lack the discriminative power to evaluate a cog-
nition, thus making them less autonomous. Further, ap-
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proaches that extend BDI [6] equate decision making to a
process to evaluate actions (intentions) with respect to cer-
tain fixed beliefs and goals. However, this makes it hard
to prioritise goals or discover potential conflicts. In recent
argument-based versions of BDI [3, 4, 2] goals can be pri-
oritized and certain conflicts can be discovered. However,
they tend to be more brittle since support and defeat rela-
tions between arguments and the acceptability of arguments
cannot be a matter of numerical degree, while sets of accept-
able arguments cannot contain conflicts. On all these points
a coherence approach is meant to provide more flexibility,
since in reality support, attack and acceptability are often a
matter of degree. One aim of this paper is to introduce co-
herence models as a more flexible alternative to logic-based
argumentation models.
A dynamic model of agency is all the more necessary in
normative agents where conflicts between goals, beliefs and
external norms are more frequent. A generic coherence-
based framework was proposed in Joseph et al. [14], apply-
ing the coherence-based approach to normative reasoning
of a single agent. They show how an agent driven by its
coherence evaluations can decide to adopt norms when it is
coherent to do so, and dynamically decide to violate a previ-
ously adopted norm when new beliefs makes it less coherent
to comply with the norm. However, since [14] only treat a
single agent case, they do not further explore the scenario
where several agents can deliberate about norms.
In the present paper we address the latter topic by ex-
tending this research to a multi-agent setting, in which two
coherence-driven agents aim to reach agreement about how
to regulate a certain aspect of their society. We aim to define
a dialogue protocol for this situation and to model how the
individual agents can behave within this protocol. In par-
ticular we address the following research questions. Given
an agent’s beliefs, its private goals (what the agent thinks is
good for itself) and its social goals (what the agent thinks
is good for the society to which it belongs):
How can an agent generate norms for discussion on
how to promote social goals?
How can an agent decide to accept a norm proposed
by another agent given its social and private goals?
How can two agents reach consensus to adopt or dis-
card a norm?
This paper is organised as follows. In Sections 2 and 3
we present the coherence model of [14] and how it is used
to model coherence-driven normative agents. In Section 4
we propose a dialogue system for two-agent deliberation on
which norms to adopt. We illustrate our approach with an
example in Section 5 and compare it with related research
in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2. COHERENCE FRAMEWORK
Since we consider coherence-driven agents, in this section
we summarise a generic coherence framework that will al-
low us to build coherence-based agents. The framework,
introduced by Joseph et al [14, 13], is based on Thagard’s
formulation of the theory of coherence as maximising con-
straint satisfaction [21]. This theory is based on the assump-
tion that pieces of information can be associated with each
other, the association being either positive or negative. The
framework of [14, 13] differs from other coherence-based
agent theories [6, 16] as it modifies the way an agent frame-
work is perceived by making the associations in the cog-
nitions explicit in representation and analysis. That is, in
this framework coherence is treated as a fundamental prop-
erty of the mind of an agent. Further, it is generic and
fully computational. The core notion is that of a coherence
graph whose nodes represent pieces of information and whose
weighted edges represent the degree of coherence or incoher-
ence between nodes. In the following we briefly introduce
the necessary definitions of this framework to understand
the formulation of coherence-driven norm deliberation.
Definition 1. A coherence graph is an edge-weighted undi-
rected graph g = 〈V,E, ζ〉, where
1. V is a finite set of nodes representing pieces of infor-
mation.
2. E ⊆ {{v, w}|v, w ∈ V } is a finite set of edges repre-
senting the coherence or incoherence between pieces of
information, and which we shall call constraints.
3. ζ : E → [−1, 1] \ 0 is an edge-weighted function that
assigns a negative or positive value to the coherence
between pieces of information, and which we shall call
coherence function.
Every coherence graph is associated with a number called
the coherence of the graph. Based on Thagard’s formalism,
this can be calculated by partitioning the set of nodes V of
the graph in two sets, A and V \ A, where A contains the
accepted elements of V , and V \A contains the rejected ones.
The aim is to partition V such that a maximum number of
constraints is satisfied, taking their values into account. A
constraint is satisfied only if it is positive and both the end
nodes are in the same set, or negative and the end nodes are
in complementary sets. Formally:
Definition 2. Given a coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ζ〉, and
a partition (A, V \ A) of V , the set of satisfied constraints
CA ⊆ E is given by
CA =

{v, w} ∈ E
˛˛˛˛
v ∈ A iff w ∈ A when ζ({v, w}) > 0
v ∈ A iff w 6∈ A when ζ({v, w}) < 0
ff
All other constraints (in E \ CA) are said to be unsatisfied.
Definition 3. Given a coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ζ〉, the

















Figure 1: A typical coherence graph with a coher-
ence maximising partition
Notice that by Definitions 2 and 3,
σ(g,A) = σ(g, V \ A) (1)
Definition 4. Given a coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ζ〉 and
given the strength σ(g,A), for all subsets A of V , the coher-




If for some partition (A, V \ A) of V , the strength of the
partition is maximal (i.e., κ(g) = σ(g,A)) then the set A
is called the accepted set and V \ A the rejected set of the
partition. A typical coherence graph is shown in Figure 1.
Due to Equation 1, the accepted set A is never unique for
a coherence graph. Moreover, there could be other partitions
that generate the same value for κ(g). Here we mention a
few criteria to select an accepted set among the alternatives.
One such criterion makes use of one of Thagard’s principles
of deductive coherence[21] (which we will present below),
namely, that “intuitively obvious propositions have an ac-
ceptability on their own”. If A1,A2, · · · ,An are sets from
all those partitions that maximise coherence of the graph g,
we say an accepted set is the one in which the intuitively
obvious propositions belong. Further, the coherence of the
sub-graphs (g|Ai , i ∈ [1, n]) gives us an indication of how
strongly connected they are. The higher the coherence, the
more preferred the corresponding accepted set. And lastly,
an accepted set with more elements should be preferred to
another with fewer elements.
We now need a way in which coherence graphs can be
constructed. That is, we need to define function ζ. As the
nature of the relationship between two pieces of information
(corresponding to the different types of coherence such as ex-
planatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and
deliberative as specified by Thagard) can vary greatly, we
do not have a unique coherence function. Thagard proposes
principles to characterise coherence in each of the different
types. Here we define one such coherence function, which is
inspired by Thagard’s principles of deductive coherence.
Thagard’s principles state that 1) deductive coherence is
a symmetric relation 2) a proposition coheres with propo-
sitions that are deducible from it, 3) propositions that are
used together to deduce something cohere with each other,
4) the more hypotheses it takes to deduce something, the less
the degree of coherence, 5) contradictory propositions are in-
coherent with each other1. Since some of these principles
1Here we do not formalise the principle that 6) intuitively
obvious propositions have a degree of acceptability on their
own. As just explained, we use it instead to select among
accepted sets.
make sense only in the context of a theory presentation, we
assume a theory presentation T in a multi-valued propo-
sitional logic while formalising these principles. We use a
multi-valued logic to model uncertainty in agents, though
Thagard’s principles, we assume, are based on a boolean
world. We formalise Thagard’s principles in terms of a co-
herence function ζT which extracts a coherence value be-
tween two nodes if either one implies the other, or together
they are used to imply a third node. We also normalise
the values between [−1, 1]. Semi-formally ζT is defined as
follows (the full details can be found in [14]):
(1) the size of the smallest set of formulas that is needed
to make α and β satisfy principle 2 (i.e. such that T , α ` β
but not α ` β);
(2) the size of the smallest set of formulas that is needed to
make α and β satisfy principle 3 (i.e. such that T , α, β ` γ
but not α, β `);
In both cases it holds that the larger T , the lower the
coherence between α and β (principle 4). Contradiction is
treated as in case 2 with the contradictory propositions to-
gether implying falsehood (⊥).
(3) the truth value of β (in case 1) or γ (in case 2): in both
cases it holds that the greater the truth value, the higher the
coherence between α and β.
In fact, the strength as defined above is separately defined
for two directions: from α to β and from β to α (in the latter
case α and β are interchanged in condition (1). To obtain
the final, symmetric strength (principle 1) between α and β,
the highest of the two directional strengths is taken.
There may be a need to find those nodes that support a
given node. This is mostly required to defend a coherence-
based decision. One of the criticisms raised against coherence-
based decision making is the lack of justification behind a
decision. To counter this criticism we introduce two simple
notions support set and conflict set of a node.
The intuition is that if two nodes have a positive coherence
between them, then they reinforce or give support to each
other. However, we cannot take support from rejected nodes
as they do not actively take part in the decision making
process. And if two nodes have a negative coherence between
them, then they counter each other. However, the conflict
set of a node should contain the support of those nodes that
conflict with the node.
Definition 5. Given a coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ζ〉 and
given a coherence maximising partition (A, V \A), the sup-
port set of a node v is given by
S(v) = {w ∈ A|e({v, w}) > 0} (2)
Definition 6. Given a coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ζ〉 and
given a coherence maximising partition (A, V \A), the con-
flict set of a node v is given by
C(v) =

w ∈ V |e({v, w}) < 0




We now describe the architecture of a coherence-driven
agent and in particular how such an agent generates new
norms in the context of norm deliberation.
3.1 Agent Architecture
A coherence-driven agent acts based on maximisation of
coherence. We consider cognitive agents based on the BDI
theory [20], using an adaptation of Casali et al. [7] based
on multi-context systems (MCS), which incorporate graded
cognitions. The grade in a cognition represents the degree
to which an agent believes (desires or intends) a particular
cognition. We use graded cognitions (represented in a multi-
valued logic) to incorporate reasoning under uncertainty into
our agent framework. Then, an MCS models the represen-
tation and interaction between these graded cognitions.
The MCS specification of an agent contains three basic
components: contexts, logics for contexts, and bridge rules
between contexts.. Contexts in a multi-context BDI are the
contexts of belief, desire, and intention cognitions. The de-
duction mechanism of MCS is based on two kinds of infer-
ence rules, internal rules `i inside each context and bridge
rules B between contexts. Internal rules allow an agent to
draw consequences within a context, while bridge rules allow
to embed results from one context into another [11]. Thus,
an agent is defined as a family of interconnected contexts:˙{Ci}i∈I , B¸ where
- each context Ci = 〈Li, Ai,`i, Ti〉 consists of a language
Li, a set of axioms Ai, and a deductive relationship
`i. They define the logic for the context and its basic
behaviour as constrained by the axioms. In addition a
theory Ti ∈ Li is associated with each context, which
represent the particular axioms of the context.
- the set B of bridge rules consists of inference rules with
premises and conclusions in different contexts.
We add further structure to [7] by associating a coherence
graph to the theory of each of the contexts. Since theories in
each contexts are expressed as coherence graphs our bridge
rules carry consequences from one graph to another.
3.1.1 Contexts and Bridge Rules
We assume that each agent has beliefs stored in its belief
context CB and goals stored in its desires context CD (both
individual and social goals). No relation is assumed between
the CD contexts of different agents, so they may not only
have different individual goals but also have different social
goals. The intentions of each agents are in the intention
context CI
2. We also assume that each agent has a norma-
tive context CO, which stores its opinions on the norms that
should hold in the normative institution of which it is part.
Each context has its own language, logic and theories ex-
pressed as coherence graphs. The context and coherence
graphs vary depending on the logic selected. Here we con-
sider a graded BDI logic based on Lukasiewicz connectives
as defined in [7]. The norm logic of the norm context is
adapted from the work of Godo et al [9] on probabilistic de-
ontic logic. Beliefs formulas are of the form (Bϕ, r) which
states the confidence on the belief of the propositional for-
mula ϕ is at least r. Similarly we have desire, intention and
norm formulas with modalities D, I and O and where the
grades represent preferences. Further, theory TB of the be-
lief context is expressed as belief graph gB = 〈VB , EB , ζTB 〉
where the coherence function ζTB is based on the deduction
relation `B defined on the belief logic. Theories TD and TO
correspond to the desire and norm contexts.
2In this paper, since we focus on generating obligations, we
do not concentrate on actions.
3.2 Norm Generation
We next discuss how coherence-driven agents can generate
norms which, if obeyed, achieve one or more social goals that
the agent thinks are important. (Recall that social goals are
what an agent thinks is good for its society while private
goals are what the agent thinks is good for itself.)
Conte et al [8] specify certain conditions under which an
agent adopts a norm. Among other things, the norm shouuld
be be instrumental to solving some of the social goals of the
agent. We extend this principle to specify conditions under
which a new norm is generated. A new norm, we claim,
stems from an unsatisfied social goal and a belief that certain
actions under certain conditions (can be empty) can achieve
this goal. We express this with the help of a bridge rule that
says if the goal context implies a social goal ψ and the belief
context implies a belief φ → ψ then the normative context
contains an obligation φ.
CB : (B(φ→ ψ), α), CD : (Dψ, β)
CO : (Oφ, f(α, β))
(Here f(α, β) is a function that computes the grades of
a complex formula given the grades of its subformulas.) If
applied naively, this bridge rule will result in too many obli-
gations: if there is more than one way to achieve ψ, then all
of them will be turned into obligations, which would over-
constrain the normative institution: what we want instead
is to make only one way to achieve the social goal obligatory,
to increase the agents’ degree of autonomy. Another aspect
not taken into account by this bridge rule is that realising
φ may frustrate another social goal, i.e., it may hold that
φ→ ¬ψ′ where ψ′ is another social goal of the agent.
To deal with these problems, the obvious similarity can be
exploited between this bridge rule and the well-known prac-
tical syllogism “If I want ψ and φ realises ψ, then I should
intend to do φ”. Walton (1996) formulated this as one of his
presumptive argument schemes, with as main critical ques-
tions “are there other ways to realise ψ?” and “does φ also
have unwanted consequences?”. In recent years several AI
researchers have formalised this argument scheme in formal
argumentation systems (e.g. [3, 4, 2]). The key idea here is
that positive answers to Walton’s two critical questions give
rise to counterarguments.
Our task is to model the same idea in our coherence ap-
proach. As coherence theory is developed to make sense of
such contradictions between pieces of information and iden-
tify those that cohere most together, modelling the above
scenario is natural using this theory. Coherence maximi-
sation partitions the cognitions including the obligations in
such a way that the most coherent set of cognitions and
obligations is selected. Note that the basic relationship we
model here is that between goals and norms, in which dif-
ferent ways to achieve the same goal negatively cohere with
each other. However, our framework uses only deduction as
the underlying relation, in which the set {p→ g, q → g, p, q}
is consistent (here p and q are different ways to achieve goal
g). Hence we add an additional constraint to make these
alternatives inconsistent. That is, for each goal g in an
agent’s desire context, we consider the set of all implica-
tions p1 → g, · · · , pn → g in its belief context and we add
formulas ¬(Opi&Opj) to its norm context for all pi and pj
such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Then two obligations Opi and Opj
negatively cohere with each other since they are alternatives.
This method deals with the first of Walton’s critical ques-
tions of the practical syllogism (are there alternative ways
to realise the same goal?). To deal with his second criti-
cal question (does φ also have unwanted consequences?) a
bridge rule is needed that expresses the negative version of
the practical syllogism: if the goal context implies a social
goal ψ′ and the belief context implies a belief φ→ ¬ψ′ then
the normative context contains an obligation ¬φ.
CB : (B(φ→ ¬ψ), α), CD : (Dψ, β)
CO : (O¬φ, f(α, β))
Then, in cases where an action achieves some but frus-
trates other social goals, our deductive coherence measure
makes the obligations that result from the positive and neg-
ative version of the practical syllogism negatively cohere.
4. DEFINITION OF PROTOCOL AND RE-
LATED NOTIONS
We next present a protocol for two-agent deliberation about
norm proposals. Dialogues are triggered by a set of mutually
accepted social goals (the ‘focal goals’). Dialogues are about
how best to promote the achievement of these goals by en-
acting norms (in the hope that the agents of the relevant
society will obey the norms and thus help realise the de-
sired effects.) During a dialogue additional social goals may
be proposed by each agent and, if accepted by the other
agent, norms for these additional goals may be proposed,
or norm proposals for the focal goals may be evaluated in
terms of their effect on the additional social goals. Besides
social goals, the agents may also have their own secret pri-
vate goals. These are not made public during a dialogue but
are used internally by the agent that holds them to decide
about making or accepting a proposal.
4.1 Main ideas
A general feature of the protocol is that it is for ‘theory
building’ dialogues. Although the agents exchange argu-
ments, the effect of these is that the agents jointly build
a coherence graph, which records the coherence relations
between the beliefs, goals and norms mentioned in the ar-
guments, and which thus records the joint understanding
of a problem. Arguments can contain norm proposals (by
applying one of the above bridge rules) or can be about
goals or beliefs. An argument’s premises and conclusion are
added as nodes to the joint coherence graph, together with
the newly induced positive and negative constraints. The
joint graph is then used by the protocol to define turntak-
ing, relevance of moves and the dialogue outcome, in ways
explained below. Besides the joint coherence graph each
agent also has its own internal coherence graph (which may
also be updated or revised during a dialogue but which re-
mains hidden for the other agent). This graph is used by
the agent to make its internal decisions about what to say
in the dialogue (e.g. whether to make or accept a certain
proposal). An agent’s private goals are incorporated into its
internal coherence graph.
The reason for choosing a theory-building approach is that
in deliberations about promoting the achievement of social
goals by enacting norms the public understanding of a prob-
lem is crucial: since the goals addressed are social and the
norms bind everyone within the relevant society, the reasons
for a consensus should ideally be public. This contrasts with
argument-based negotiation [19], where the negiotating par-
ties are self-interested so that all that counts is whether an
argument persuades the hearer to do something in the dia-
logue (like accepting or revising a proposal) that is benefi-
cial to the speaker. In consequence, protocols for argument-
based negotiation usually are not of the theory-building kind
but define the outcome of a dialogue purely in terms of ex-
plicit acceptances and rejections. Some persuasion protocols
are also of that kind, which is suitable when the participants’
only goal is to win a dispute. However, when public interests
are at stake, a theory-building approach arguably is better.
The idea of theory-building dialogues is not new (see e.g.
[12]), but in most current dialogue systems for argumenta-
tion the theory built during a dialogue is a set of arguments
or some related structure (such as a dialectical graph). By
contrast, in the present dialogue system the theory built dur-
ing a dialogue is a coherence graph. In fact, the protocol will
require of arguments that when added to the joint coherence
graph, there is indeed a positive coherence in the graph be-
tween the argument’s premises and conclusion. Thus in our
system the notion of an argument is not basic but derived:
the basic reasoning/inferential structure is not a set of argu-
ments but a coherence graph, and the inferential machinery
applied to the joint theory is not an argument-based logic
but a coherence calculus.
The protocol enforces relevance and coherence of dialogues
in two ways. Initially, a norm proposal must be made for
a social goal that triggered the deliberation. Subsequently,
each agent must make sure that its position is best satis-
fied in that in the joint coherence graph its norm proposals
are better realised then those of the other agent. The latter
is an implicit relevance mechanism: argument moves must
be chosen such that they improve the speaker’s current posi-
tion, which implies that they must somehow pertain to what
has been said so far. To capture this, at each stage of the
dialogue preferred partitions of the joint graph are identified
for each player, which are the partitions in which their own
norm proposals are best satisfied. Each player must aim to
have the most coherent preferred partition.
Another important element of the protocol is that as soon
as a player has succeeded in having the most coherent pre-
ferred partition, the turn shifts to the other player, who must
then try to have the most coherent preferred partition, and
so on. This builds a dialectical element into dialogues that
promotes the efficient exploration of all sides of a problem
(cf. [15]’s ‘immediate-response’ disputes). A dialogue ends
in agreement when both players’ preferred partitions accept
the same set of norms.
4.2 Definition of the dialogue system
We now formally define the topic and communication lan-
guages Lt and Lc and the protocol.
Let Lt consist of the union of the agents’ context languages
for beliefs, desires, intentions and norms. Then Lc consists
of expressions Φ since Γ such that Φ and all elements of Γ
are well-formed formulas of Lt. (Below such expressions will
be called arguments; at first sight, this notion of argument
would seem to be wildly unconstrained but, as indicated
above and formalised below, the protocol enforces relevance
in various ways.) A move is a pair (p, x) where x is an ex-
pression from Lc and p is the player who utters x (sometimes
we will abuse notation and refer to x only as a move, leaving
the speaker implicit). A dialogue is a sequence of moves. For
any dialogue d = m1, . . . ,mn, . . . the sequence m1, . . . ,mi is
denoted by di, where d0 denotes the empty dialogue. For
any dialogue d and move m the notation d,m stands for the
result of appending m to d, i.e., for d as continued by m.
Definition 7. For any dialogue d the joint coherence graph
g(d) = 〈V (d), E(d), ζ(d)〉 associated with d is defined as fol-
lows (we leave the coherence function implicit since it can be
deduced from the other elements by the definitions of [14]):
• V (d0) = E(d0) = ∅ while ζ(d) is undefined;
• For any move m = Φ since Γ :
– V (d,m) = V (d) ∪ {ϕ} ∪ Γ ∪ C, where:
∗ ifm = (Oψ,α) since (B(ψ → χ), β), (Dχ, γ), S3
then C = {(¬(Oψ ∧ Oψ′), f(α, α′)) | d con-
tains a move with argument (Oψ′, α′) since
(B(ψ′ → χ), β′), (Dχ, γ), S such that ψ 6=
ψ′};
∗ otherwise C = ∅
– E(d,m) = {(v, v′) | v, v′ ∈ V (d,m) and ζ(v, v′) is
defined}
The joint coherence graph is initially empty. Each move
adds its premises and conclusion as new nodes, after which
the edges and coherence values are recalculated according
to the definition of ζ (cf. Section 2). In addition, if a move
proposes a norm in alternative to an earlier proposal for the
same goal, we also add the corresponding constraint between
the two norms as a new node.
Next it is defined how well a dialogue satisfies a player’s
norm proposals.
Definition 8. A norm (Oφ,α) is proposed by player p in
dialogue d if d contains a move (p, x) where the conclusion
of x is (Oφ,α).
A goal (Dψ, γ) is addressed by p in d if d contains a
move (p, x) where x is of the form (Oφ,α) since (B(φ →
ψ), β), Dψ, S (= applying the first bridge rule of Section
3.2).
A partition (A, V \ A) of g(d) is potentially preferred by
player p if the accepted set A of the partition contains a
norm proposed by p for each goal addressed by p in d.
A partition (A, V \ A) of g(d) is preferred by player p if
it is potentially preferred by p and there is no other poten-
tially preferred partition of g(d) by p with a higher coherence
value. Let Pp(d) be any partition of g(d) preferred by p.
Definition 9. A dialogue d best satisfies player p if the
coherence of its preferred partitions of g(d) is higher than the
coherence of the preferred partitions of g(d) of its opponent.
Technically, a protocol is a function Pr that assigns to any le-
gal dialogue a set of moves which are its legal continuations.
A dialogue is legal if any move in it is a legal continuation
of the sequence to which it is appended. If Pr(d) = ∅ then
d is a terminated dialogue.
As explained above, each dialogue is assumed to be initi-
ated by a set F = {(Dψ1, α1), . . . , (Dψn, αn)} of focal social
goals. The protocol is then defined as follows.
Definition 10. For any dialogue d, m = (p, x) ∈ Pr(d) iff:
3S is a, possibly empty, set of additional premises. For
exmaples see Section 5 below.
1. p is the player to move in d;
2. if d = d0 then s is of the form (Oφ,α) since (B(φ →
ψ), β), (Dψ, γ), S where (Dψ, γ) is a focal goal;
3. if E(d,m) contains positive support links from each
premise of x to its conclusion;
4. if the coherence value of p’s preferred partitions in
g(d,m) is not higher than the coherence value of p’s
preferred partitions in g(d), then
(a) either m is p’s first proposal for a goal addressed
in d;
(b) or m repeats a proposal for a norm by p′.
5. d contains no move (p, x);
6. the players do not agree in d.
Furthermore, we have that player p is to move in di if either
di best satisfies p
′ or no player is best satisfied in di and p′
was to move in di−1.
To comment on these rules, the first rule is obvious while
the second rule says that each discussion starts with a pro-
posal for a norm that (if complied with) achieves some focal
social goal. Each next move may be an argument of any
form, as long as it respects the remaining protocol rules.
Rule (3) says that each move must be an argument in that
in the resulting joint coherence graph, the premises of the
move must positively cohere with its conclusion. Rule (4)
says that each move must either improve the position of
the speaker, or make the speaker’s first norm proposal for a
goal addressed in d, or accept a norm proposal by the other
party. Rule (5) prevents a player from repeating his own
moves, while rule (6) makes sure that a dialogue terminates
after the players have reached agreement.
For defining agreement we need the following notation.
For any partition P = (A, V \ A) of graph g let Np(P )
denote the norms proposed by p belonging to A.
Definition 11. The players p and p′ agree in dialogue d
if all focal goals have been addressed in d and there ex-
ist preferred partitions Pp(d) and Pp′(d) of g(d) such that
Np(Pp(d)) = Np′(Pp′(d)).
In words, the players agree if they have discussed all focal
goals and if they have preferred partitions that contain the
same set of norms for all goals addressed in the dialogue
(which may include more goals than just the focal goals,
namely, if a move has proposed a new social goal).
4.3 Internal Deliberation
We now sketch the internal deliberation of each player p to
generate and evaluate proposals. Coherence-driven agents
make decisions based on coherence maximisation, same is
true for the cases of generation and evaluation of proposals.
4.3.1 Generate a New Move
We assume that at any time the coherence graph of an
agent is closed under the application of the bridge rules.
The accepted set resulting from the coherence maximising
partition is the base for generating new moves. Moves are of
the form Φ since Γ. Φ can be any element of the accepted set
of a coherence maximising partition, and then Γ is the set
of support nodes of Φ. Among the possible Φ’s, an element
is chosen based on its priority. In the case where the delib-
eration is on norms, norms can be given priority over other
elements. Given the composite coherence graph of the agent
g = 〈V,E, ζ〉, an agent performs the following to generate a
new move:
1. For all partitions (Ai, V \ Ai), Ai ⊆ V calculate the
coherence σ(ςg′ ,Ai) using Definition 3.
2. Using Definition 3 from Section 2, find a coherence
maximising partition A = Ai|max(σ(ςg′ ,Ai)). Note
that there may be more than one such partition (pref-
erences can be set based on discussions on Section 2).
3. Φ = (aϕ, α) such that α = max (r|(aϕ, r) ∈ A) where
a ∈ {B,D, I,O}. (In the case of moves about norms,
a = O and A is VN |A and (Oϕ,α) 6∈ g(d) (not a pre-
viously proposed norm, g(d)= joint coherence graph).
4. The support set S(Φ) = S(aϕ, α).
5. Return the dialogue move m = Φ since S(Φ)
6. If Φ = null, then m is set to null.
4.3.2 Evaluate a move
The internal deliberation of player p is similarly based on
coherence maximisation. p introduces the received move into
its respective coherence graphs and recalculates the com-
posite coherence graph. Upon maximising coherence, if the
elements of the move belong to the accepted set of its co-
herence maximising partition, it accepts the move. Else it
generates the reasons for rejecting a move. Given the pro-
posed move m = (Φ, S(Φ)), a coherence-driven agent should
act as follows:
1. Recompute the composite coherence graph g = 〈V,E, ζ〉
with the elements of m using bridge rules.
2. For all partitions (Ai, V \ Ai), Ai ⊆ V calculate the
coherence σ(ςg′ ,Ai) using Definition 3.
3. Using Definition 3 from Section 2, finds a coherence
maximising partition A = Ai|max(σ(ςg′ ,Ai)).
4. If Φ ∈ A and S(Φ) ⊆ A, then accept m. Else calculate
the conflict set C(Ψ) for each Ψ such that Ψ ∈ {Φ} ∪
S(Φ) and Ψ 6∈ A.
5. EXAMPLE— NORM DELIBERATION
Now we take a real scenario in which two coherence-based
agents discuss certain norms for regulating a discussion fo-
rum, especially on how often the participants may reply to
each others’ contributions. The focal goals of the agents are:
• f = efficiency (discussions should not take too long)
• s = coverage (discussions should cover as much rele-
vant material as possible)
• p = fairness (the participants should be treated fairly
compared to each other)
• t = quality of contributions (the participants should
be stimulated to write high-quality contributions).
In addition, one of the agents has a secret private goal
u = x not become a moderator.
With this background, two of the possible ways to achieve
these goals and how far they help achieve each of the focal
goals are given below:
1. r: everyone gets one reply. This promotes efficiency
(r → f) and quality of individual contributions ( r →
t) but demotes coverage (r → ¬s). The reason why
this promotes quality of contributions is that with just
one possible reply everyone will make it as good as
possible, since they will not get a second chance. It
has no net effect on fairness since on the one hand
everyone gets the same number of replies (which is
fair) but on the other hand an expert in the field will
get less opportunity to say what he wants to say than
a layman (which is unfair).
2. q: everyone may reply as long as allowed by the mod-
erator. This also promotes efficiency (q → f) since the
moderator can be trusted to keep discussions short. It
also promotes fairness (q → p) since the moderator can
be trusted to give experts more replies than novices. It
has no particular effect on coverage or quality of con-
tributions (since judging whether everything has been
covered is too difficult for the moderator).
Theory A V \ A
TN (Oq, 1), (O¬r, 0.8)
TB (B(q → f), 1), (B(q → p), 0.9)
(B(r → ¬s), 1)
TD (Df, 1), (Dp, 0.9), (Ds, 0.8)
Table 1: The initial theory of Agent A
Initially, agent A is aware of the social goals f, p and s (TD
in Table 1) and has the knowledge that q helps achieve two
of the goals namely f and p while r hinders realising a goal
s (TB in Table 1). Hence A generates the norms (Oq, 1)
and (O¬r, 0.8) (TD in Table 1 and Figure 2). Since A so
far has no incoherence, nor any other ways of achieving its
goals, every element falls in the accepted set of its internal
coherence graph. Since Oq is preferred over O¬r, A initiates
the deliberation protocol with the proposal for norm (Oq, 1),














Figure 2: The initial coherence graph of Agent A
Since coherence of the preferred partition of A in the joint
graph (Figure 3) is trivially greater than that of agent B,
its now B’s turn to move. B initially has knowledge of the
focal goals f and t and of the facts that r helps achieve these
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Figure 3: Joint graph after d0
goals while q hinders achieving one of its secret private goal
u (see Table 2). Hence B generates two norms (Or, 0.9)
and (O¬q, 0.9). B also has all the elements in the accepted
set of its internal coherence graph so far (in Figure 4 and
(Table 2)), as it does not yet know of the conflict between
Or and Oq.
Theory A V \ A
TN (Or, 1), (O¬q, 1)
TB (B(r → f), 1), (B(r → t), 0.9)
(B(q → ¬u), 0.9)
TD (Df, 1), (Dt, 0.8), (Du, 0.9)
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Figure 4: Initial coherence graph of B
After A’s move B updates its own coherence graph with
A’s proposal. However, it is natural to assume that the
agents may not have the same preferences on goals. Hence,
even though B incorporates the new information into its
theory, the degrees of these cognitions vary according to the
preference ranking of the goals. The updated theory of B
is in Table 3 and the corresponding coherence maximising
partition of its own coherence graph is in Figure 6. Since this
partition rejects (Oq, 0.9), B makes a counterproposal for
the norm (Or, 0.9). This results in the new joint coherence
graph of Figure 5.
Since the coherence of the preferred partition of A in this
joint graph is not greater than that of agent B, it is now A’s
turn to move. Since A has no knowledge of B’s proposed
norm (Or, 0.9) it updates its internal coherence graph with
B’s proposal. However, A finds out that r upsets its social
goal s. The coherence maximisation (Figure 7) hence rejects
(Or, 0.9). The joint coherence graph after A has rejected B’s
proposal (dialogue d2) is as shown in Figure 8.
Since coherence of the preferred partition of A in the joint
graph (Figure 8) is greater than or equal to that of agent B,
its now B’s turn to move. B incorporates the new informa-















Figure 5: Joint graph after d1
Theory A V \ A
TN (Or, 1), (Oq, 1)
TB (B(r → f), 0.9), (B(r → t), 1),
(B(q → f), 1), (B(q → p), 0.9)
TD (Df, 1), (Dt, 0.9), (Dp, 0.8)




















































Figure 7: Coherence graph of A after dialogue d1

























Figure 8: Joint graph after d2
tion about Or into its theory and calculates the new coher-
ence maximising partition as shown in Figure 9. Due to the
fact that the norm (Or, 0.9) upsets social goal s in addition
to the competition it has from (Oq, 1), the coherence max-
imising partition now rejects the norm (Or, 0.9) along with
the private goal u, the social goal t and the beliefs relating
them. Hence B now proposes the only norm in its accepted
set (Oq, 0.9). Now the accepted set of preferred partitions
of both A and B in the joint coherence graph (Figure 8)
contain the single norm Oq proposed by both of them, so
the dialogue ends in agreement. The entire dialogue is as






























Figure 9: Coherence graph of B after dialogue d2
Dialogue Agent Φ Γ
Id
d0 A (Oq, 1) {(Df, 1), (B(q → f), 1),
(Dp, 0.9), (B(q → p), 0.9)}
d1 B (Or, 0.9) {(B(r → f), 0.9), (Df, 1)}
(Dt, 0.9), (B(r → t), 1)}
d2 A (O¬r, 0.9) {((B(r → ¬s), 1), (Ds, 0.8)}
d3 B (Oq, 0.9) {(Df, 1), (B(q → f), 1),
(Dp, 0.9), (B(q → p), 0.9)}
Table 4: Dialogues between agents A and B
6. RELATED RESEARCH
Coherence models have been earlier applied to legal rea-
soning by Thagard [22], Amaya [1] and Bench-Capon & Sar-
tor [5]. Thagard and Amaya use explanatory coherence
to model scenario-based reasoning about evidence, while
Bench-Capon & Sartor use a coherence model in their the-
ory formation approach to case-based reasoning. Thus these
proposals model different aspects than ours; moreover, they
do not provide protocols for multi-agent deliberation. Fur-
ther, they do not propose methods to build a coherence
graph and hence their models of coherence are not fully com-
putational.
To our knowledge, the first proposal to generate argu-
ments from coherence graphs was by Pasquier [17], However,
this model differs from ours in several important respects.
Firstly, in [17] coherence is introduced only at the action
(intention) level, while in our proposal coherence-driven ar-
gumentation can can concern any of the BDI modalities.
Furthermore, [17] provides no definitions for constructing
coherence graphs and for generating arguments from them.
We next compare our model to proposals that use logic-
based argumentation. We know of no such proposals that
address the problems of norm generation and normative
agreement. However, norm generation is similar to intention
generation by an agent who reasons how to achieve its goals,
while normative agreement is similar to reaching agreement
on a course of action to solve a problem. For both phenom-
ena logic-based argumentation models have been proposed,
so we will compare our model to these.
We must first distinguish between logics and protocols for
argumentation. The former define which conclusions can be
drawn from a given body of information, while the latter reg-
ulate how such a body of information can be constructed in
dialogue. Several argument-based logics for intention gener-
ation have been proposed. Bench-Capon & Prakken [4] aim
to formalise the reasoning model underlying [3]’s dialogue
model for disputes over action, while Amgoud & Prade [2]
propose an alternative account. The essential ingredient in
both approaches consists of two rules for constructing argu-
ments that correspond to our two bridge rules. Bench-Capon
& Prakken then apply Prakken’s [18] accrual mechanism
to aggregate arguments for or against the same intentions,
while Amgoud & Prade leave the aggregation of such argu-
ments outside the logic and model it decision-theoretically.
We first note a difference in applying the first bridge rule
(the positive practical syllogism), arising from the difference
between intentions and norms. While [4] allow to conclude
Dr from Dp, q ⇒ p and r ⇒ q by chaining two applications
of the practical syllogism, we do not allow such chaining but
only allow to conclude Oq. This is deliberate, since we want
to respect the agents’ autonomy to decide for themselves
how they will comply with the norms they are facing.
The logics of [4, 2] instantiate the general framework of
Dung [10], which starts from a set of arguments with a bi-
nary defeat relation and then determines which sets of ar-
guments can be accepted together. This is similar to de-
termining partitions of a coherence graph but in approaches
that instantiate Dung’s format, support and defeat relations
between arguments and the acceptability of arguments can-
not be a matter of numerical degree, while sets of accept-
able arguments cannot contain conflicts. As remarked in
the introduction, on all these points a coherence approach
is meant to provide more flexibility, since in reality support,
attack and acceptability are often a matter of degree. One
possible benefit of this is a natural modelling of accrual of
arguments for the same conclusion (see e.g. the arguments in
the above example). By contrast, in [2] accrual is modelled
outside the logic while the logical accrual mechanism of [4]
is quite complex. In future research we aim to investigate
whether the added flexibility of our coherence approach has
other advantages.
On the other hand, a strong point of argument-based ap-
proaches is that they yield explicit reasons why an outcome
should be adopted or rejected, while coherence-based ap-
proaches are often criticised for their lack of transparency.
In our approach we have addressed this problem by deriv-
ing our coherence measures from the deduction relation of
an underlying logic, thus making explicit why two pieces of
information are positively or negatively related. This fea-
ture was then exploited in our protocol, which contains the
notion of an argument.
To compare our protocol with logic-based protocols for
reaching agreement over action, the most detailed proposal
we know of is that of Atkinson [3], who derives a dialogue
protocol from an extended version of Walton’s [23] argu-
ment scheme for justifying actions and its critical questions.
Let us see to what extent our protocol allows her dialogue
moves to be moved as arguments in reply to an application
of the first bridge rule. Let it be of the form Oφ4 since
B(φ→ ψ), Dψ. Note first that we have a restricted domain
ontology in that unlike Atkinson we do not distinguish be-
tween goals and values, between truth and possibility and
between circumstances and actions. All these simplifications
are meant to focus on the essence of our proposal, which is
its use of the coherence mechanism. These simplifications
make that only a number of Atkinson’s critical questions
are relevant for our model (since we do not distinguish be-
tween values and goals, we have replaced Atkinson’s term
‘value’ in CQs 9 and 10 by ‘goal’):
• CQ2: Assuming the circumstances, does the action
have the stated consequences? This can be addressed
with an argument for conclusion B(¬(φ → ψ)). This
move will introduce a negative coherence link between
this conclusion and the original belief B(φ→ ψ).
• CQ5: Are there alternative ways of realising the same
consequences? This can be formulated with an alter-
native application of our first bridge rule: Oφ′ since
B(φ′ → ψ), Dψ. Combined with the constraint ¬(Oφ∧
Oφ′) introduced by this move, this move adds a nega-
tive support link between Oφ and Oφ′.
• CQ9: Does doing the action have a side effect which
demotes some other goal? We can express this by an
application of the second bridge rule. This adds a node
O¬φ to the joint coherence graph, which negatively
coheres with the node Oφ.
• CQ10: Does doing the action promote some other goal?
We can express this by applying the first bridge rule to
the other goal, resulting in another argument for the
same norm. As shown above, this normally improves
the speaker’s position and thus naturally models ac-
crual of arguments.
• CQ11: Does doing the action preclude some other ac-
tion which would promote some other goal? This cor-
responds to the situation that we have B(φ → ¬ψ)
and B(ψ → χ) and Dχ. Space prevents us from going
into logical detail here. Roughly, we can only express
this if ψ → χ is necessarily true, i.e., true in all possi-
ble worlds: then the argument for Oφ can be countered
with an argument for Oψ applying the first bridge rule
and further extended to O¬φ: then Oφ and O¬φ neg-
atively cohere in the joint coherence graph.
Concluding, given our restricted domain ontology, our model
essentially allows for all argument moves and critical ques-
tions proposed by Atkinson; a possible advantage of our ap-
proach over Atkinson’s is a natural way to model accrual of
alternative arguments for the same norm (which is arguably
more natural than [4]’s logic-based model of accrual). We
leave it for future research to generalise our domain ontology
to the full case of Atkinson and to investigate other possible
advantages of our approach over hers.
4Here the grades are ignored for convenience.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed coherence-based models as
an alternative to logic-based BDI and argumentation mod-
els for normative reasoning. In particular, we have provided
a model for how two coherence-based agents can deliber-
ate to regulate a domain of interest. We first presented
a deductive coherence model, in which the coherence val-
ues are derived from the deduction relation of an underly-
ing logic; this allowed us to identify the reasons for why a
proposition is accepted or rejected. We then incorporated
this coherence model in a model of how agents can generate
candidate norms for deliberation, after which we proposed
a dialogue protocol for such deliberations. The resulting
model was shown to be roughly equally expressive as cur-
rent logic-based deliberation protocols, while it provides a
more natural account of accrual of arguments.
In future research we aim to investigate other possible
benefits of coherence models over logic-based argumenta-
tion models, as well as formal relations between these mod-
els. We also want to study properties of our model, such as
the conditions under which an agreement is also internally
accepted by the agreeing agents. Finally, we aim to extend
the expressiveness of our model, for instance by introducing
a distinction between goals and values and by using a richer
representation language for norms.
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